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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------00000----------
LA VAR J. COATES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. Case No. 17344 
MARY COATES, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
---------00000----------
RESPONDENT 1 S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. Appellant filed a Complaint 
against the Respondent seeking, among other things, an 
equitable distribution of the marital assets and an Order 
requiring each of the parties to bear their o'Wn respective 
•attorney's fees. Respondent answered and counterclaimed 
seeking, among 'other things, an award to her of the family 
residence; an equitable distribution of the personal property; 
and an award to her of attorney's fees. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the Honorable Jay E. Banks, and 
after two days of trial, the Trial Court made its Findings 
Of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered a Decree of 
Divorce which, in part awarded Respondent the marital 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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residence, subject to a $27,000.00 lien in Appellant's favc: 
awarded Respondent alimony from Appellant for a period of 
one year; awarded Appellant a 1976 Buick; a residential 
duplex building lot, a 2 3 foot Sea Ray boat, trailer and 
accessories, a truck and camper, certain i terns of furnitur:./ 
his tools, his own stock, credit union account and pension 
plan and all jewelry in his possession. Respondent was 
awarded the parties' residence on Thunderbird Drive, subjeC'! 
I 
to the lien noted above, a 1976 Buick, her retirement accoc::, 
the jewelry in her possession, and the household furniture 
and furnishings in her possession. The Court further divic; 
responsibility between the parties of certain marital obtic:j 
ordered Respondent to bear 2/3' s of the 1979 income taxes 
and Appellant to bear the remaining 1/3 of such taxes and 
awarded Respondent $1,500.00 attorney's fees. A Notice 
Entry of Decree of Divorce was filed. No objections to th:f 
I 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or Decree of Divorc:j 
were made nor was a Motion for New Trial made. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the Trial Court's 
Decree of Divorce in all particulars and an award of all 
costs incurred by her in connection with this Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I 
· sio'" Because Appellant has made certain errors and omis ··1 
. · necessar: in his Statement of Facts, Respondent feels it is 
2 
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to make her own Statement of Facts which more accurately 
sets forth facts as found by the Trial Court and as are 
supported by the record. 
The parties were married on June 26, 1969. They 
r:/ experienced marital problems during the marriage (R-235) and 
ultimately separated December 1, 1979 (R-225). Throughout 
the 10-year marriage, Appellant worked as an airplane mechanic 
for Hughes Airwest. At the time of the trial, he was 
ic::, grossing approximately $21,500.00 per year in connection 
with his employment (R-320). Appellant, in addition to 
c; raising the parties' two children, worked throughout the 
c:j marriage (R-243). For the last 13 of those years, she was 
employed by Abbott GM Diesel, first as a bookkeeper and then 
in approximately 1973, as Secretary-Treasurer of the corporation 
(R-244). Because of her position with the company from 
1973 to 1979, she earned a substantially large salary. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 10) When the company was dissolved 
in November of 1979, Respondent was terminated. From 
that date Respondent was unemployed, receiving unemployment 
compensation in the amount of $589.10 per month (R-35). She 
was unemployed at the time of trial. 
Respondent is an only child (R-391) and her parents 
were extremely generous to her both before and during her 
marriage. Her father, a retired airlines worker and janitor 
(R-394), testified he purchased for her the home which 
3 
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I 
I 
I she brought into the marriage (R-395) . He assisted her wit.:' 
extensive remodelling of that home (R-396). After her marri:: 
to Appellant, he loaned the parties approximately $13,000.0t I 
for a down payment on the parties' present home. This loan 
was subsequently repaid (R-396). Respondent's father spent . 
f 
great amounts of time and money remodelling, and repairing ' 
the present home of the parties (R-398). In May of 1979, 
Respondent's parents made another $6,000.00 loan to the 
parties to cover additional remodelling costs on the Thunder:) 
Drive home (R-398). They gave Respondent oil paintings, 
clocks, sterling silver and money for the acquisition of 
Respondent's jewelry (R-403, 404, 405). In addition, they 
gave Respondent money for furniture placed in the home (R-
406) . Respondent's parents were also very generous to the 
parties' children and gave them an organ, pool table, down 
payments for cars, etc. (R-402, 409). They also loaned the 
parties $1,500.00 for a down payment on an undeveloped real 
estate lot located in Granger (R-400). 
The Trial Court found, as fact, that these gifts and 
loans had been made (R-180). The making of these gifts anc 
loans was admitted by Appellant (R-283, 303, 306, 307, 3lli 
313, 316). 
Also, during the trial, the Trial Court received, 
without objection, Defendant's Exhibit 10, which compared 
the income of Respondent and Appellant for the years 
4 
I 
• 
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I 
I 
I 
t'' 
1969 through 1979. That Exhibit showed that during that 
period the Appellant earned $188,170.73 while Respondent 
earned $236,292.28. Because of this income disparity, 
especially in the last year of the marriage, the Trial 
court ordered the Respondent to pay 2/3's of the 
t f 1979 Federal and State Income taxes due (R-190, Decree 
I 
... 
of Divorce) . 
Likewise, because of Respondent's unique employment 
status, the parties were afforded numerous opportunities to 
purchase items of personal property at reduced and discounted 
rates - Opportunities solely provided because Respondent 
was an officer of a large company. For example, the truck 
and camper were acquired at a discount rate through Respondent's 
employer (R-308). The Buick automobiles were likewise 
acquired in the same way at reduced rates (R-309). The boat 
which was brought into the marriage by Appellant was sold to 
an employee of Respondent and, this, in turn, allowed the 
parties to purchase their Sea Ray Boat (R-310). 
There is also no dispute as to the facts that the 
Respondent brought a home into the marriage which when sold, 
shortly after the marriage, generated $20,500.00 in net 
proceeds (R-283). These funds were used as a portion of the 
down payment on the Thunderbird Drive home (R-306). In 
addition, Respondent's father testified that after she lost 
her employment, he had assisted her financially in providing 
5 
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her money to support her and the parties' two children IR· 
400). 
Both parties presented to the Trial Court documentary 
evidence and testimony related to each and every asset whir 
was acquired by the parties either before or during, the ·1 
marriage and after separation. The Trial Court was preser.:,. 
with appraisals, estimates of values of the assets, andili 
sources from which those assets were received or acquired. 
Further, at the conclusion of the evidence each party 
presented to the Court a summary of assets together with a 1 
proposed distribution (Exhibit 44-D and 45-P). Each of 
those exhibits contained not only a list of the assets whi: 
were in issue but also an accompanying estimated value of 
each such asset. 
After receipt of all the evidence, the Court, in that 
portion of the Findings of Fact which awarded the Appellan: 
a $27,000.00 lien irt the family residence stated: 
The amount of this lien has been determined by t'. 
Court after the Court's consideration of evidence 
presented to the Court by the parties of the value oi 
the assets each party brought into the marriage, the 
source and value of the assets acquired during the 
marriage and all credits and offsets to which ~ach , 
party may be entitled. (R-181, Paragraph 3, Finding. 
of Fact.) 
In addition, the Court further made detailed factual 
findings as to the property each party brought into the 
h Was acqul.. red aurinc marriage (R-180) and the property t at 
the marriage (R-179). 
6 
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POINT I 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY AND EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTED 
THE MARITAL ASSETS 
Appellant contends that the Trial Court inequitably 
distributed the marital assets and consequently abused the 
wide discretion afforded a Trial Court in making such a 
property distribution. Both the documentary evidence and 
the testimony presented to the Trial Court clearly show that 
this is just not the case. 
In order to prevail, Appellant is required to show that 
the Trial Court, in making its distribution of property, 
misunderstood or misapplied the law; entered Findings not 
supported by the evidence; or caused a serious inequity so 
as to constitute an abuse of discretion. English v. English, 
565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah, 1977). As was clearly stated in 
Searlev. Searle, 522 P.2d 697, (Utah, 1974): 
Although it is both the duty and prerogative of 
this Court in a case of equity to review the facts as 
well as the law, Article VIII, § 9, Constitution of 
Utah, the Trial Judge has considerable lattitude of 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property 
interests in a divorce case. The actions of the Trial 
Court are indulged with the presumption of validity, 
and the burden is upon Appellant to prove such a 
serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. (Footnote) There is no fixed formula for 
the division of property; § 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953, pro-
vides that when a decree of divorce is made, the Court 
may make such orders in relation to property as may be 
equitable. (Footnote) Id. at 700. 
Appellant's burden is not an easy one and the record, 
especially the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does 
7 
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not show in any way an abuse of discretion by the Trial 
Court. As was stated in Sorenson v. Sorenson, 3 7 6 p. 2d 54i 1 
I 
(Utah, 1963): 
I 
U 1 th . 'f . . . I n ess ere is mani est in] ustice and inequity,,' 
a clear abuse of discretion, the Court will not sub- '· 
stitute its Judgment for that of the Trial Court. Id 
at 548. -·I 
In making a property distribution, the Trial Court may 
consider numerous factors in arriving at an equitable 
result. Among those are such things as the property each 
party brought into the marriage; the property acquired 
during the marriage and the efforts and contributions of 
each party in the acquisition of such property; gifts recei~~ 
during the marriage; and inheritances. Because of the 
foregoing, a property division need not be equal, but only 
equitable. See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 P.2d 1066 (Utah, 
1951). Such was the case in Tremayne v. Tremayne, 211 P.2d 
452, (Utah, 1949) where the Trial Court awarded the wife 
4/5' s of the marital estate and the Supreme Court affirmed 
that decision. 
Appellant, even though he requested an equitable dis· 
tribution in his complaint (R-3) has now attempted in his 
Brief to argue that he was entitled an equal distribution. 
In this particular case, an egual distribution is not~ 
equitable distribution and the Trial Court so recognized 
this fact. 
The figures and values contained in Appellant's Brief 
certainly do not deal with and, in fact, omit three impor'.' 
8 
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factors considered by the Trial Court - (1) the property 
Respondent brought into the marriage; (2) Respondent's 
monetary contribution during the last four years of the 
marriage; and (3) the gifts, loans and assistance received 
from Respondent's parents. 
As a preliminary matter, Respondent feels it is necessary 
to set the record straight regarding certain claims of 
Appellant that the Trial Court did not properly consider the 
value of the property it distributed. Evidence was presented 
by both sides, (documents and testimony) pertaining to the 
value of the property in issue (the house; car; boat; truck 
and camper; furniture; jewelry; stocks; credit union and 
retirements accounts; and the real estate lot) The Court, 
in giving the Appellant a $27,000.00 lien in the parties' 
residence (Respondent had asked that he be awarded only a 
$13,000.00 lien) specifically stated in the Findings of Fact 
and the Decree that: 
The amount of this lien has been determined by the 
Court after the Court's consideration of evidence 
presented to the Court by the parties, of the value of 
the assets each party brought into the marriage, the 
source and value of assets acquired during the marriage 
and all credits and offsets to which each party may be 
entitled. (R-181 and 187-188.) 
Little more need be said as to whether the Court considered 
the values of the property in dividing the property as it 
did. 
Turning now to the facts before the Trial Court, it is 
9 
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not disputed that Respondent brought into the marriage a 
home, Appellant did not (R-280, 338). Respondent's father, 
! 
expended large amounts of time and money improving that ho:.: 
(R-306, 396). As it should have, the Trial Court awarded/ 
each party the property he or she brought into the marriage/ 
I 
and because the equity in the home Respondent brought into J 
the marriage had been used as a down payment on the Thunde:: 
I 
Drive home, the Trial Court properly gave Respondent 
credit for that equity. Appellant, virtually ignores the:: 
facts in arguing that he was treated unfairly. 
Secondly, Appellant makes little mention of all of th:i 
help and assistance given the parties by Respondent's 
parents. The record is also undisputed as to Respondent';. 
father's generousi ty towards Respondent, his only child. 1 
As a retired airline worker and maintenance man, he gave 
continuous assistance to the parties - (remodelling of 
home Respondent brought into the marriage (R-396); loan 
for down payment for Thunderbird property (R-396); loan 
for the duplex lot (R-400); work and materials on Thunder:j 
property (R-397); numerous gifts (R-403-406)). Even ApoeJ 
reluctantly acknowledged these facts in his testimony (R· 
"f"' 281-283) and the Trial Court specifically found these~-
assistance to have been made (R-180; Para. 15, Findings c'[ 
Fact). Because these gifts and loans were so substantia•' 
in size and frequency, the Trial Court rightly took this; 
account, in making its property distribution. 
10 
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The third unique factor presented to the Trial court 
was Respondent's very fortunate employment status as secretary-
Treasurer of a large company over the last seven years of 
the marriage. During that time Respondent earned an unusually 
large salary. This was demonstrated to the Trial Court by 
the income comparison offered as evidence by Respondent 
without objection by Appellant (Exhibit 10-D). A portion of 
that Exhibit is set forth below to illustrate the vast 
difference in contributions made by the parties over that 
period of time. 
YEAR 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
TOTALS 
LA VOR COATES 
$11,558.66 
12,698.59 
16,211.27 
18,257.88 
18,046.01 
19,415.00 
23,147.87 
24,230.45 
20, 000. 00 (approx.) 
$188,170.73 
MARY COATES 
$ 8,350.53 
22,564.20 
20,288.93 
22,250.00 
22,250.00 
24,800.00 
23,830. 77 
30,328.61 
49,000.00 
$236,292.28 
Exhibit D-10 
The Trial Court properly recognized this fact in dividing 
responsibility for taxes as it did - Respondent 2/3's, 
Appellant 1/3. 
In addition, through her employment, Respondent was 
able to provide the parties with unique purchasing opportunities 
allowing the parties to acquire property at reduced and 
substantially discounted prices (R-308, 309, 310) - another 
fact Appellant conveniently overlooks in his Brief. 
Finally, in spite of a specific finding to the contrary, 
11 
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Appellant claims the Trial Court did not consider the vaJ,,: 
.. , 
I 
of the parties' furniture, stocks and jewelry. This is kl 
I 
not true, inasmuch as Appellant himself presented an exhib. 
listing all of what he claimed to be the personal propert: 
in issue (Exhibits 32-P and 37-P) and the values attribut~. 
to the same. The testimony of both of the parties and 
I 
Respondent's father established that much of the property·:·j 
those lists was: (1) the property of the children -
(The Trial Court ordered that that property remain with tt:: 
children (R-191)); and (2) property given to Respondent by! 
father near the time of separation (R-406). Further the I 
testimony revealed that Appellant had, just subsequent to 
separation, been given the opportunity to select what 
furniture and personal property he wished to retain (R-291
1 
342) and he did take various items when he vacated the 
residence (R-342). 
Likewise, each party was given their own jewelry (R·, 
182, 183). Appellant also fails to mention the fact that 
Respondent's jewelry was acquired by cash given her by her 
father for the specific purpose of purchasing this jewelry 
(R-405). 
The stock which Appellant claims the Court did not 
consider was liquidated and used by Respondent for two I i 
purposes - a graduation gift for her son (R-336) and payrrt·J 
for improvement on the home ( R- 3 41) . In addition, duriM 
k h d a)rei: the course of the parties' separation, the stoc a 
12 
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been divided equally between the parties (R-352, 383). 
Finally, Appellant's argument regarding marital 
misconduct is simply a ~ sequitur. He first cites authority 
standing for the proposition that a court should not "punish 
a party for marital misconduct and then infers that the Trial 
court should have punished Respondent (Appellant's Brief, Page 
10). This is yet but another attempt to "second guess" the 
Trial Court and secure a result which is more to Appellant's 
liking. 
The Trial Court, throughout the trial, was conscientious 
and thorough in reviewing the evidence and Appellant has 
failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion whatsoever in 
relation to its property distribution. 
POINT II 
THE ATTORNEY' FEES AWARDED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WERE REASONABLE AND NEEDED BY THE RESPONDENT 
In a divorce action, the Trial Court may in its discretion, 
award either party such sums as will "enable such party to 
prosecute or defend the action." § 30-3-3, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953). As in the case of a property distribution and a 
support award, the Trial Court is also vested with wide 
discretion when making an award of attorney's fees. 
It would lead to intolerable instability of judgments 
if this Court should assume the prerogative and accept 
the responsibility of merely second guessing a trial 
judge who has done a conscientious job of attempting 
to make a just and equitable allocation of property and 
income of the parties in regard to alimony and support 
money, as the trial judge appears to have done here. 
It is due to this fact, taken into consideration with 
the nature of the trial judge's authority and duty, and 
his advantage position that in such matters he is 
allowed a comparatively wide latitude of discretion 
13 
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which will not be disturbed in the absence of a cl I 
b . . ea• a use a circumstance which we have not found here ·1 
.<ci~atic;ins).This is a~so true of attorney's fees~hic· 
it is likewise the Trial Court's prerogative to fi · 
(Citation) Bader v. Bader, 424 P.2d 150, 151 (Utahx. 
1967) I I 
Such an award must rest on evidence of need and reasonabl· 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah, 1980). There is ample 
evidence of both in the record in this case. 
At the time of trial, Respondent was unemployed and 1, 
receiving only $589 .19 per month unemployment compensation 
(R-334). Her monthly expenses and the maintenance of the 
home, herself and her children far exceeded her income 
(Exhibit 12 and R-334). Her father had been helping to 
maintain her during the action (R-350, 400). The Court's 
property distribution gave her no ready cash and no income· 
producing assets (R-177-185, Findings of Fact and Conclusi 
of Law) This evidence more than amply supported the conc11 
that Respondent needed assistance to pay her attorney's 
fees. 
The Trial Court's award of fees was also more than I 
reasonable. Respondent's counsel requested an award of 
$3,300.00 (R-411) and supported that request with acomput' 
printout of time and costs expended on Respondent's behalf 
(Exhibit isl. No objection was made to this Exhibit (R· 
214). Likewise, Respondent's counsel testified that in hi: 
opinion the fees requested were reasonable (R-411) · Also, 
did Appe 
no objection was interposed to that testimony nor 
14 
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counsel even elect to cross-examine Respondent's attorney 
(R-411) • 
After receiving that evidence, the Trial Court in 
accord with its broad discretion felt that Appellant should 
contribute $1,500.00 to Respondent's attorney's fees - a sum 
less than half the amount requested by Respondent. Clearly 
both criteria pertaining to awards of attorney's fees were 
satisfied and there was no abuse of discretion in making 
this attorney's fees award. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no basis in fact or law to alter the decision 
of the Trial Cou;;t. The property distribution was fair and 
equitable given the contributions made by each party to 
acquire those assets and the sources of those assets. The 
Trial Court in its wisdom after being presented with more 
than ample-evidence, ordered a division of the property 
which was equitable. That was exactly the result which 
Appellant requested in his initial Complaint. Appellant has 
shown no abuse of discretion in connection with the property 
distribution. 
Likewise, the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees 
was certainly appropriate given Respondent's need and income, 
and the reasonableness of the fees requested. 
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
the Decree of Divorce in this matter in all particulars and 
to award Respondent her costs incurred in connection with 
15 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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this Appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this J..~t/: day of April, l9il, 
GUSTIN I ADAMS I KASTING & LIAPIS 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing RESPONDENT Is BRIEF were placed with "The 
Runner Service" to be delivered to Walter R. Ellett, Esq,, 
5085 South State, Murray, Utah, 84107, this ~yo! 
April, 1981. 
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